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Sears, Roebuck and Co. is one of the largest procurers of trucking services in the
world through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Sears Logistics Services (SLS).  SLS controls
supply chain elements that originate at the vendor (manufacturer) through distribution
centers to retail stores, and from vendor to distribution centers to cross dock facilities.  This
case examines a major change in the method Sears used in contracting for truckload carrier
services for this supply chain.  It provides a pioneering example of complex business to
business e-Commerce.
In the early 90's, SLS sought to lower its truckload carrier costs by consolidating
trucking service acquisition to allow truckload carriers to better deploy their assets and
share the savings with SLS.  Two innovations offered the promise of better asset
deployment, which could result in shared savings with SLS if implemented through a
properly designed auction:
(i) use of three-year contracts that included surge demand contingencies; and
(ii) simultaneous letting of contracts on a large number of lanes through a process
that solicited single offers for multiple lanes – thereby allowing  carriers  to
coordinate SLS business with other business and reduce related  empty or low
value movements.
A standard one-sided procurement auction, increasingly referred to as a reverse auction, is
the process of choice to implement the first innovation.  To implement the second
innovation, a combined value procurement auction is necessary.  In a combined value
auction, an order can be comprised of multiple items.  This allows a trader to express their
combined value for the group rather than forcing them to cobble together individual trades
and so face the risk of missing links in a desired chain.
SLS had contracted the consulting firm of Jos. Swanson & Co. (JS&Co) to advise
how to implement the desired consolidation of trucking.  JS&Co identified as promising
the combined value trading technology being developed within the California Institute of
Technology1 (Caltech) by the founders of Net Exchange (NEX).2  SLS, JS&Co, and NEX
formed a team to implement the desired consolidation using combined value auctions. The
initial auction would involve 854 lanes with a service cost of approximately $190 million
per year.  The combined value sequential auction that was implemented reduced this cost to
$165 million per year, a 13% savings3.  Much of what follows will describe this first
auction.  We also supply summary information on subsequent combined value auctions that
were performed by or for SLS.
                                                
1 See Banks et al. (1989).  At the time, the only other work on combined value auctions that we know of
was Smith et al. (1982).
2 Information concerning NEX can be found at http://www.nex.com
3 All of the cost savings in this paper were estimated based on: (1) actual realized rates on existing lanes
with a history, (2) estimated rates on existing lanes without available rate data, and (3) state to state matrix
rates on new lanes.
2Lead Up to a Combined Value Auction
SLS put together a strategy which, it believed, would allow it to garner significant
savings in its logistics costs and which it also believed would encourage carriers to
participate actively in the consolidation process.  Under the leadership of some imaginative
and forward-looking people in SLS, and with the important help of JS&Co, SLS had
begun to experiment with procurement auctions.  By allowing carriers to offer single
classes of transportation service to SLS through single-round sealed bid auctions,
significant cost-savings were being achieved.  The idea was to extend this approach to the
larger consolidation effort.  SLS and JS&Co recognized that the trucking firms might rebel
at having a sizable piece of their regular and profitable business put up for competitive
auction.  In fact it was highly plausible that some of the more reliable firms might refuse to
participate and that, therefore, there might not even be sufficient capacity among the rest to
service the needs of SLS.
A strategy was formulated to identify a small number of "partners" who would be
given exclusive rights to bid in the auction and who would be helped in their planning and
participation. Limiting the number of partners provided additional incentive for participation
due to the opportunity. A significant amount of effort was spent in this process so that SLS
would know it could rely on the carriers who were selected from the auction process to
provide the promised services.4  Thi  also provided an additional level of confidence for
the carriers, since they knew that the other participants were “peer” carriers.  In the end, 14
national and large regional carriers were qualified and participated.5
At this time, however, it was not known precisely how an auction of this
magnitude would be organized. What was to be auctioned?  That is, what would it mean if
a carrier won?  Would they have to deliver anything Sears requested for the term of the
contract?  Would they only have to handle only a fixed maximum weekly set of loads,
leaving SLS to find others to handle excess shipments?  Should SLS auction one lane at a
time; and, if so, in what order and how fast?  Or should they do them all at the same time?
If so, how could they possibly coordinate all the bidding?6  Let us turn to how SLS chose
to answer these questions.
Combined Value Design
If the carriers were going to be able to create savings for themselves, thus creating
value to be shared between themselves and SLS, they would need to be assured of
business on a relatively riskless basis, and they would need to be able to coordinate their
offers across multiple lanes.  Justifying the first part of this statement is obvious and was
satisfied by SLS choosing to auction three-year contracts with contingencies for surge and
                                                
4 It is not obvious that significantly different outcomes would have occurred in the auction and beyond if
the qualification bars had been lowered and the penalties for non-compliance raised.  Some effort and costs
to redress non-performance would have arisen but less costs would have been incurred in the qualification
process.
5  The manner in which SLS "qualifies" transportation service bidders is proprietary.  To this date, it
remains one of the most complex preparation efforts in business to business commerce.  It is important to
note that all candidates learn the names of the competitors that have been qualified.
6 It is interesting to note that the same issues would later arise in the design and operation of the FCC
auctions of the electro-magnetic spectrum.  In the SLS case there was little sentiment in favor of single-
lane auctions, as it had made use of that approach much earlier.
3slack demand.  Justifying the second part of this statement is perhaps less obvious.  The
efficient use of assets, through the reduction of empty mile movements, requires carriers to
solve a fairly complex minimization problem, coordinating not only the SLS shipments but
also the shipments they expect or have under contract to others on lanes SLS may not even
be auctioning.  What a firm is willing to supply services for, on a specific Chicago to Los
Angeles route, depends critically on what they have committed in the LA to Chicago
direction (which may itself involve multiple lanes).  If an SLS lane (say St. Louis to
Chicago) is part of that return cartage then the amount the trucking firm is willing to accept
for the Chi-LA lane depends on how much they will be paid for the St. Louis-Chicago
route.  That is, the amount they are willing to accept to do both the Chi-LA and the St.
Louis-Chicago lanes depends on the combined value.  It will generally be less than the sum
of the individual parts.7
How can one design the auction to reveal and take advantage of these combined
value opportunities?  Late in1992, Joe Swanson asked this question of John Ledyard
whose research had involved, among other things, creating auctions that provide an
answer8.  Called combined value auctions, they differ primarily in only one crucial aspect
from traditional auctions.  They allow participants to make an offer of a single dollar
amount for a collection of items.  In the SLS case, a carrier would be able to say "I ask $1
million for the Chicago-LA lane and the St. Louis-Chicago route" meaning "I am willing to
service the two lanes for a fee of at least $1 million if and only if I can service both lanes".
Once this new type of procurement offer is considered, the rest of the design follows.
First, the winners are determined by accepting the offers that minimize the total cost of
procuring the services when one and only one carrier per lane is allowed.9  S cond, all
winning offers will be paid at what was asked.
A critical, if seemingly innocuous, part of the auction design is the stopping rule.
The stopping rule for an auction is absolutely crucial to its performance, both in the final
cost of acquisition and in the time to completion, because it affects the incentives and the
information of the bidders.  One option is to let everyone submit as many offers as they
wish, up to a specified time.  At that time, winners are determined and the auction is over.
This is just a sealed-bid procurement auction using combined value bids.   The problem
with this is it requires bidders to consider all contingencies and to evaluate all of the
business implications of winning each subset of lanes, it encourages submission of all
possible bids by all bidders, and it has been shown to result in a higher final cost of
procurement.  The experimental work at Caltech had shown this conclusively.  We chose,
instead, to use a sequential auction in which bidding would proceed in rounds.  At the end
of each round, provisional winners would be announced.  Going into the next round, all of
the provisional winning offers from the previous round were held by the auctioneer and
carriers submitted new bids against that set.10  L boratory test runs had revealed that this
                                                
7 We have provided two examples in the appendix that illustrate how combined value in transportation
services occurs.  In Appendix A we provide a simple 3 lane stylized example.  In Appendix B, we provide
parts of the test-bed example we used to demonstrate to SLS and the truckers how a combined value auction
would work.
8 That work, best described in Banks et al. (1989), was done mostly for NASA through the Jet Propulsion
Lab.  Although combined value auctions had not yet been used in practice, Ledyard and his team had
extensive laboratory experience demonstrating the potential power of combined value bidding over
traditional methods.
9 Suppose there are three bids for routes 1 and 2 where bid one is $10 for route 1, bid two is $35 for route
and bid three is $40 for routes 1 and 2.  The winning bid(s) will be bid three since $40 is less than $45.  A
mathematical formulation is given in Appendix C.
10 This requirement is extremely important.  Without it bidders face no penalty from, say, randomly bidding
or from bidding to attack an opponent.  It imposes a commitment on the bidders - each bid can be viewed as
4sequential process led to a significant increase in cost savings because it allowed the firms
to concentrate their efforts on those lanes that gave them a cost-advantage.   In a situation
where little is known by anyone about the true opportunities for cost savings from
combined value offers, it is important to have a sequential auction.  The stopping rule used
was of the form – if total acquisition cost did not decline by at least x% from the previous
round, then the just-completed round is declared to have been the final round
Selling Combined Value to SLS
The first step was to convince SLS that such an auction was feasible (that is, one
could actually run such a thing).  NEX created a test-bed11 environment and then ran
combined value auctions in that scaled down world in the Caltech Economics Laboratory.
The runs were successful.
In the meantime, the NEX team had to deal with scaling up the auction part of the
test-bed so that 854 lanes could be handled.  This is a, potentially huge, combinatoric
problem12 that, even with today's technology, is daunting.   It was almost overwhelming in
1993.  Nevertheless, starting from standard algorithms with some front-end sorting and
culling of orders, we were able to create an algorithm that easily handled this scope of
problem.
 Once we had designed an acceptable CVA it was necessary to explain it to the SLS
team and get their approval.   Here the experimental test bed became important as a
demonstration tool.  We took the tes -bedto SLS so they could actually participate in a
CVA and, hopefully, see that it would be possible for trucking firms to understand and
how savings would occur.  The SLS team bought into the concept.14  The final step was to
                                                                                                                                                
a contract proposal to which the bidder will adhere if the auctioneer accepts it.  Allowing withdrawal of
provisionally winning bids extends the auction and creates bad incentives.
11 A test-bed in this case is a scaled down version of the items to be auctioned and the incentive structure of
the participants.  It is similar to using scale models and wind tunnels in aircraft and automotive design.
12 Each bidder could theoretically submit (2 raised to the 854th p wer) a huge number - possibly more than
the number of stars in the universe.  There were, however, practical limits on the number of bids submitted.
In particular, in the actual auction bids were submitted via a spreadsheet on floppy disks.  At the time this
limited what a bidder could do.  The maximum number of bids submitted was 4595 and no bidder ever
complained that they could not submit enough bids.  The algorithm had no trouble finding the optimal
solution in less than an hour.  (Today that would be less than a minute.)  There are economic reasons for
the small number of submitted bids but that is a subject for another paper.
13 The FCC faced this same choice in the design of the auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. They, and
their consultants, did not rise to the occasion as SLS did.  Although it is controversial, particularly among
the consultants who made lots of money on the FCC design, the next statements are, I believe, true.  The
FCC and its consultants were unwilling to consider the SLS experience to be relevant even though they
were informed about it.  Doomed to relive history as a result, the FCC ultimately chose to auction
everything off simultaneously but to not allow bidders to submit combined value bids  - potentially
forgoing very significant revenues.
14 The FCC faced this same choice in the design of the auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum. They, and
their consultants, did not rise to the occasion as SLS did.  Although it is controversial, particularly among
the consultants who made lots of money on the FCC design, the next statements are, we believe, true.  The
FCC and its consultants were unwilling to consider the SLS experience to be relevant even though they
were informed about it.  Doomed to relive history as a result, the FCC ultimately chose to auction
everything off simultaneously but to not allow bidders to submit combined value bids  - potentially
forgoing very significant revenues.
5take this test-bed to the trucking firms.  It would serve both as a sales device to get them
eager to participate in the ultimate auction and as a training device so their teams could learn
how to participate successfully.15  JS&Co did this with the firms that had been pre-
qualified.  It was a time intensive process.16
The Auction Results
The auction lasted through 5 rounds with about 1 month between each round.  The
length of time of the overall process is one of the only complaints the bidders had.  In
retrospect there seems to be no reason why the time between rounds couldn't have been
significantly reduced. The data are interesting and instructive.
Round  1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
(final round)
# of bids
submitted 3383 4409 4595 3691 4589
# of
packages
submitted 2374 1698 2273 1803 1721
# of
packages in
the winning
allocation 650 637 577 595 575
Acquisition
cost ($000)
if stopped $187,149 $179,288 $172,744 $168,337 $165,371
% drop from
previous    4.5     4.1     2.4     1.8
There was significant use of the multi-lane offer capability of the combined value
auction.  A fair number of package bids won indicating significant savings from this
feature. And, contrary to the expectations of some that combinatoric calculations would be
a problem, the time to calculate winning bids was generally in the 15-30 minute range, once
some modifications had been made to the software.
One fact not obvious from these statistics is that many bidders wanted to be able to
submit a bid like "I will (supply lanes A, B, and C for $100) or (supply lanes D, E, and F
for $120) but not both".  Although this feature, called XOR, is now standard on combined
value auctions, the SLS auction did not allow such bids.17  Nevertheless, the bidders found
a clever way to do this.  They would submit two overlapping bids using a small,
                                                
15 The Swanson team did most of this sales and training using the materials developed by the Caltech team.
16 Today, creative use of the Web and interactive software can easily cut the time involved in teaching and
training.  For example, at Caltech we have been able, by using the web, to cut the time devoted to
explaining the process to less than an hour.
17 We did allow, however, an alternate procedure in the experiments we ran which allowed bidders to put a
cap on the total commitments they were making with all of their bids.  Se appendix C and the use of a
capacity constraint.
6inexpensive route, say, G.  They would submit "I bid $101 for A, B, C, G" and "I bid
$121 for D, E F, G".  Obviously both couldn't win.18
All participants were contacted 2-3 weeks after the final results were distributed and
they were asked for their thoughts on the process and outcome.  The carriers overall
reaction to this type of auction was favorable.  They particularly liked the format and level
of detail in the traffic information provided.  They were reasonably happy with their
outcomes.  Each carrier had lost one or two lanes they were disappointed to lose, but they
recognized it as a reality of the business and the process.
Most of the negative issues related to execution items.  With respect to the length of
the process, most thought it should have gone fewer rounds.19  Whether they had enough
time to respond varied by carrier.  Some looked at every lane in every round and wanted
more time (these were the national carriers).  Others were more focused on what they were
bidding and would have been happy with less turnaround time.  The level of sophistication
in analysis varied greatly among carriers.  It involved detailed modeling for some; others
worked out their strategies using pencil and paper.20
Some bidders thought that the process was purely price driven but shouldn't have
been.  They felt there was no consideration given to the service capabilities of the carriers21
and that there was no advantage to being an incumbent on a route.22
The Market Test
Following up on the success of this first SLS procurement auction, SLS bought
software and hardware from NEX with the capability of running similar auctions.  We have
data from 5 auctions run by SLS during 1995 and 1996 with the help of JS&Co.
#carriers# lanes Acquisition costSavings est23 Savings %
1 12 17 $1,200,000 $80,000 6 2/3
2 12 35 $15,000,000 $3,000,000 20
3 24 135 $49,000,000 $5,000,000 10
4 16 190 $10,000,000 $2,500,000 25
5 16 159 $27,000,000 $2,000,000 7 1/2
                                                
18 It is interesting that computer scientists now use this trick- they create a dummy route with zero value -
to create algorithms to solve these combinatoric problems.
19 This may be because each had a different favorite stopping round - the one they would have won more in.
Or simply because in each round they had to compete further to stay alive and they saw profits slowly
shrink.
20 New processes providing better feedback to bidders now exist.  These "next generation processes" appear
to be significantly more user friendly and faster than the path-breaking but simple process used by SLS.
One example of these new processes can be found in DeMartini etal. (1999).
21 There was, in fact, such consideration given at the time of qualification.
22 Performance capabilities were definitely part of the participant selection process.   Incumbency benefits
had been considered and would realistically be implicit as the carrier would have been able to develop
supporting business to support those routes during its tenure of operation.
23 These savings values may be somewhat inconsistent.  For those lanes where established prices did not
exist, SLS utilized State to State Matrix rates (rates available for “one off” type shipments).
7Thus, logistics services for a total of 536 lanes were acquired for about $102.2 million.
The total savings to SLS were about 13% or about $13.3 million.  Combing these data with
those from the first auction yields the conclusion that, over a three-year period, SLS saved
more than  $84 million by running six combined value auctions.  Truckload transportation
services were acquired for 1390 lanes for a total cost of $587 million.  This became the
accepted methodology of transportation services procurement for SLS.  The concept is still
in use today and has been fully supported by management since that time.
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9APPENDIX A
A Stylized Example of Combined Value
Consider the following lane configuration and weekly load requirements of a retail
company.
One way to fullfill the requirements is to buy or lease 10 trucks and allow a lot of empty
back-hauls.  But this would be a very costly solution.  There are cheaper solutions, but one
might ask a different question.  Can one gain by outsourcing?
Suppose there are 3 trucking firms - each with the same costs but different customer bases.
Each trucking firm has a current contract for a lane and has some (usually uncertain)
revenue from the return trip.
Firm # Contract Route Current loads Revenue from return
trip
1 Chicago to LA 5 X
2 NO to Chi 10 Y
3 NO to LA 10 Z
Notice that firm 1 would be happy to carry the retailer's required 5 loads from LA to Chi
for any price greater than X.  That is because they can take advantage of the combined
value in servicing both directions on the LA to Chicago lane.  If X < C(LA to Chi), the cost
of shipping 5 loads from LA to Chicago,  then the retailer and Firm 1 both have the
potential to gain if the retailer outsources  the transportation services for that route.  At any
price P such that X<P<C(LA to Chi), both gain.
One can continue the analysis.  Firm 2 will carry the 7 loads from Chi to NO for any price
greater than Y and Firm 3 will carry the 10 loads from LA to NO for a price greater than Z.
Finally one should note that Firm 3 is also willing to carry the 5 from LA to Chi and the 7
from Chi to NO for a price greater than W = Z + C(LA to Chi to NO) - C(LA to NO).   In
this case, Firm 3 is able to reap combined value from the triple lane combination of LA to
Chicago to New Orleans to Chicago.
Los
Angeles
Chicago
New
Orleans
5
7
10
10
If the retailer knew the values of X, Y, Z, and W, what should they do?  The answer is
easy.  If X+Y+Z <W+ C(LA to NO), then hire 1 to handle the LA to Chicago loads, hire 2
to handle the Chicago to New Orleans loads, and hire 3 to handle the LA to New Orleans
loads.  However, if X+Y+Z > W+C(LA to NO) then hire 3 to handle both of the LA to
Chicago and Chicago to New Orleans loads.  The retailer does the LA to New Orleans
themself.  That is, in the second case they    do not  outsource the whole thing.
In practice, the retailer does not know what the value of W, X, Y, or Z.  And the
optimization problem can involve 854 lanes instead of 3.  Signing contracts one at a time
can interfere with the retailer's ability to take advantage of the combined values available.
That is why a combined value auction can provide value to both the retailer and the trucking
firms.
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APPENDIX B
The SLS Experimental Set-up
The goal in designing the experiments for the SLS auction was to provide a test-bed that
exhibited the benefits of combined value in an example that looked familiar to truckers and
that would enable us to demonstrate how easy and productive a combined value auction
would be.  Taking a route map of the United States with 854 lanes and reducing it to
something manageable was the first step.  We chose to focus on 7 locations and 9 lanes.
The structure can be seen in the next figure.24
Figure B.1
                                                
24 One can use one's imagination to determine what the locations might be.  But the structure was chosen
so that most combined value opportunities known to exist could be represented.
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To put meat on this structure we added network loads, one-way times and costs.  This
information is common knowledge, available and known to all.
Lane Miles Cost Loads Reserve
price
AB 300 450 5 5000
AC 300 450 15 13000
AF 400 520 20 11500
AG 200 360 10 7000
CF 100 210 5 2100
DE 100 210 10 4000
FA 400 520 15 13000
GA 200 360 15 10000
GD 500 600 15 15000
FG 300 450 0
EF 200 360 0
There is also private information including other traffic revenue (both yours and some
information on the possibilities for others), units (trucks) at one's disposal, and
opportunity costs.  For example, here is the information we gave Firm 1.
Lane Your
potential
loads/week
Network
average
loads/week
Your
potential
revenue/load
Network average
revenue/load
BA 5 5 300 325
CA 10 12 400 300
FA 5 5 500 300
AG 5 5 160 75
FC 10 7 150 100
ED 8 8 190 100
AF 5 5 500 300
DG 15 15 650 450
EF 8 10 390 350
The number of units in your fleet is   8 and the profits/week per unit not used is    10 .
Finally, to help them, we calculated the combined value of several packages and reported it
as "some packages that you may want to consider".  For firm 1 these looked as follows.
Package you
would bid
for
Other revenue Operating
cost
Required
units
Break-even
bid
AB BA 1500 4500 2 3000
AG GA AG 800 10800 3 10000
GD DG 9750 18000 3 10000
AF FA FA 2500 20800 8 18300
AC CF FC 1500 CA 400019800 6 14300
DE CF ED 1520 EF 3120
FC 1500
15600 4 9460
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APPENDIX C
The Simple Mathematics of A Combined Value Auction   
In the experiments, a bid is a detailed specification of a package of lanes a firm is willing to
service along with a total minimal amount of revenue the firm requires to receive for
supplying the lanes in that package.  (Lanes were supplied in an all-or-none fashion.)  A
bid consisted of 4 items:
1. The list of lanes to supply
2. A bid (revenue): the minimum amount needed by the firm to supply those lanes/week.
3. An estimated capacity utilization in whole units for each package and
4. A capacity constraint that specifies the total units you all willing to supply across all of
your accepted bids.
The last two features of a bid allowed each firm to submit more bids than they would
actually be able to service since the algorithm would not accept more than could be
serviced.  These last two features were not included in the actual SLS auction.
One can think of a bid as <{(x,b,u)}, U> where x(j,k,l) = 1 if firm j wants package k and
lane l is part of that package, where b(j,k) is j's revenue bid for package k, where u(j,k) is
the unit capacity estimated by j for k, and U(j) is j's total capacity.
Given a collection of bids from every one, the combined value auction algorithm solves
min Sj,kb(j,k)d(j,k)
Subject to:
Sj,k x(j,k,l)d(j,k)   <1  for all lanes l,
Sj,k u(j,k)d(j,k) < U(j) for all j,
and
d(j,k) = 0 or 1.
If d(j,k) =1 in the solution, then firm j is (provisionally) awarded lane k at a price of b(j,k).
(For the SLS auction, the middle two constraints were not included.)
